Kierkegaard’s project, broadly construed, is to offer a corrective of Christianity, and to advance and defend his own positive conception of the same. The version of the Christian life-view or standpoint that Kierkegaard advocates he calls “Religiousness B.” Kierkegaard’s defense of Religiousness B involves showing how it is better-suited to human existence than the alternatives: the aesthetic standpoint, the ethical standpoint, and the immanent-religious standpoint (or “Religiousness A”). In her book Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, Michelle Kosch argues that what unifies Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the latter standpoints is his claim that they “incorporate distorted accounts of human agency” (Kosch, Freedom and Reason, 140). Accordingly, Kosch maintains that the despair that accompanies the aesthetic, ethical, and immanent religious standpoints for Kierkegaard “will turn out to be the unwillingness to accept human agency with all of its particular conditions.” (Kosch, Freedom and Reason, 154). In this paper I argue that, if Kosch’s reading is correct, then Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the alternative standpoints turn against his account of Religiousness B—the standpoint that Kierkegaard wants to advocate. This is clearly problematic.